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TOWN MEETING



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"THE OUTLOOK FOR OUR CHINA POLICY"

Speakers:

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HERBERT FEIS

PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

Moderator:

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In cooperation with
The Residential Seminars on World
Affairs—Lafayette College

BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

Broadcast Sundays, ABC Network, 8 to 9 p.m., Eastern Time

"THE OUTLOOK FOR OUR CHINA POLICY"

ANNOUNCER: The setting for tonight's TOWN MEETING is picturesque and historic Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania, and our program comes from Watson Hall of International Affairs. The building, contributed to the college by Thomas J. Watson, is a unique combination of residence and club for foreign students and those interested in world affairs. The Lafayette College School of International Affairs prepares men on an undergraduate level for overseas service. With an enrollment of 1500, Lafayette maintains a balance for the arts departments on one hand, and seven engineering departments on the other. It also has a College Church, a fully constituted church composed only of students in full membership who ordain their own officers and carry on their own program of church work on the campus and in national foreign missions. TOWN MEETING is happy to have this association with Lafayette College and this important seminar on China policy.

And now to preside as moderator of our discussion, here is Shepherd L. Witman, Director of Residential Seminars on World Affairs!

MR. WITMAN: It is most appropriate that this TOWN MEETING should bring together three educational institutions, each serving the people of this country in its own specialized way. TOWN MEETING has long been in the foreground of educational radio; Lafayette College is a renowned academic institution; and the Residential Seminars on World Affairs are pioneering new fields in citizen education.

These residential seminars provide an opportunity to withdraw from the routines of daily life for concentrated study, thinking and exchange of ideas on world affairs. They are designed to help strengthen our ability to think wisely about our world relations. The topics are chosen for their importance and immediacy of impact on American policy, as well as the long view of our nation's role in the world. They are international in membership, as well as subject, and some of them are held abroad. In fact, the next one will be held in Munich, Germany at the end of August.

This meeting to which you are now listening is part of one of these seminars. In the lounge with us here in Watson Hall of International Affairs are some forty men and women who have come from different parts of the United States -- from Hong Kong, Formosa and Pakistan -- to discuss the outlook for our China policy during the coming week. Later, they will be joined by other specialists from New Zealand, Ceylon and Indonesia. Many different points of view will be expressed and the ideas that lie deep in the minds of men from other parts of the world will have a chance to be heard. Thoughts will be exchanged throughout the days and into the evenings in both formal seminar sessions and informal talks. And out of this will come a deeper understanding of American relationships with the Far East.

We want all of you to share in as much of this as possible -- so in the next hour this group will bring to you some of the issues and problems they see and the relations between the United States and China. They will give you some interesting backgrounds and perhaps even some new ideas with which to judge this week's conference between the ambassadors of this country and Communist China. We will take you right now into a meeting of this seminar. Let's listen to what some of these people are thinking.

First of all, we'll hear some comments from three distinguished gentlemen who are here composing a panel for this discussion group.

We'll hear first from Mr. Paul A. Linebarger who is Professor of Asiatic Politics at the School of Advanced International Studies. The School of International Studies is a division of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. Dr. Linebarger was reared in China and is the author of fourteen published books, half of which deal with China. He returned last year from an extended research trip to Formosa, Borneo, Malaya,

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West Bengal and other areas settled by the overseas Chinese. Dr. Linebarger, what do you think is our problem? What are we discussing anything at all about our relationships with China? Why should we even consider this -- isn't there a settled issue -- don't we have settled policies? What are some of the problems with which this seminar ought to deal and ought to consider?

DR. LINEBARGER: We are being driven both by the Communist bloc and by the neutralist bloc to do something amounting to recognition of the Chinese Peoples Government in Peiking. In my opinion, the Summit meeting is so recent and of such overwhelming importance that our China policy should, at all times, be considered as a part of the larger whole of our national policy throughout the world.

MR. WITMAN: That certainly is a statement of the problem -- the scope and the importance of the problem. Let's have some more discussion of this question of what is the problem which we have to face here -- why are we even considering the question of America's relationship to China -- the outlook for our China policy.

Next let's hear from Dr. Herbert Feis. I have no doubt that you will have something to say. Dr. Feis is an historian, a government official, who has taken an active part in making our foreign policy. In 1931, he became advisor to the International Economic Office to the Department of State and he has served the government in similar advisory relationships ever since. He has been a very active member of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton University and he has served on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department. As you know, his books and articles on the Far East are very widely read. Mr. Feis, will you comment on why we have a problem and what our problem is?

DR. FEIS: The reasons are many and very simple. The first one is that we are kept on the fringe of war, the edge of war, with China and that's an uncomfortable situation. We'd like to get off it. Another one is that the difficulties with China affect our policies in regard to other important countries like Japan, the Soviet Union -- affect them and distort them -- that's important. And I think, in addition to that, many of us who work on these matters have a sense of an unhealed wound. For so long we thought of ourselves as the country who was China's friend and supporter and to find ourselves in the position of hostility, on the edge of war, is very difficult to understand and I think we are all moved by an impulse to correct it.

MR. WITMAN: Here we have another point of view and now I think we should hear from the other side of the Pacific itself. We have with us this evening the Honorable Chih-Mai Chen, who is the Minister-Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Washington. During the war, he served as Secretary to the Cabinet of the Chinese government at Chungking and since then he has represented his government at the San Francisco conference, at the General Assembly of the United Nations and many other international conferences. From where you sit, Dr. Chen, what do you think is the problem and the reason why we should consider this question -- the outlook for our China policy?

DR. CHEN: The United States is undoubtedly the leader of what is known as the free world and what she does has a great deal of effect on the many peoples in Asia who are struggling for freedom and independence and from deliverance from Communist domination. Therefore, all the peoples in Asia, not only Chinese but the other peoples in the great continent of Asia, are looking to the United States for constructive leadership in their fight for freedom.

MR. WITMAN: I think we have pretty clearly established that this is a vital issue -- it is one in which American interests are at stake and our vital interests are at stake -- apparently all three of us are in agreement on this point. All right, now

let's start digging out the meat of the problem and let's begin to analyze how we have to consider the question of America's relationship to China, and let's see if we can't come up with some general view of the outlook for our China policy. The first thing that occurs to me is the fact that the United States has certain specific commitments to Nationalist China. There is the very positive and definite relationship between these two governments and certainly we need to begin our consideration of this problem in terms of that factual foundation. What is it that constitutes the relationship between the United States and Nationalist China? What are our commitments? What are our responsibilities? To what extent are we tied in our foreign policy in the Far East to our predefinition of relationships with Nationalist China?

DR. LINEBARGER: I'm glad you asked me first, instead of our friend, Professor Chen, to save him the embarrassment of having to speak partly as a government official and partly as a scholar. Our American arrangements with Nationalist China include a mutual security treaty and military aid and training. That is not a unilateral arrangement. On our side, the Chinese Nationalists are intimately associated with us in the defense of the western Pacific. We have guaranteed the defense of the Island of Formosa although leaving the offshore islands in question. Our guarantee is reinforced by the delivery of planes and weapons to make the forces on Formosa effective. I would like to point out that it is probably the presence of those American planes and weapons which keep Formosa from being overwhelmed by the Russians -- the actual Soviet Russian planes and weapons in the hands of the Communist Chinese. There is no question of the Communist Chinese attacking Formosa. They do not have the means to do so. The means which they have are Russian planes and Russian weapons and only our American planes and weapons committed to Nationalist China are stopping them.

DR. FEIS: There is no more difficult problem in diplomacy that the adjustment of obligations and facts born of the past to circumstances of the present and the future. And there is no problem that the American government still is more awkward about and problems of that type are more awkward, let us say, in the British government. This is one of them. Now the obligation, I think, arises primarily in the past. To me it is primarily a human one, rather than a legal one, or even a strategic one. This, of course, is a disputable statement. The one conclusive feature of that relationship -- to me the one that no matter how our policy shapes should not be ignored -- is a sense of human obligation towards the Chinese group with which we were allied during the war and whose fate depends upon our action. To repeat, the legal commitment and the strategic relationship are both secondary in my mind to the other one.

MR. WITMAN: I have the impression that the strategic commitment, the responsibility of the United States, is viewed by you gentlemen as a very definite and positive one and that we should go to the defense and need to go to the defense of Formosa, in the event of such a necessity. Is that correct?

DR. LINEBARGER: I would certainly agree with that.

MR. WITMAN: All right, so we have commitments set forth here on the part of the United States to China which are of three-fold character, I believe. We have said there are certain legal responsibilities which have been defined in our relationship with Nationalist China. We have said that there are certain responsibilities of a strategic character which involve our whole pattern of relationship to the Far East and we have said that there are certain deeply imbedded historical reasons why the United States is attached to the Nationalist government. There is still another side to this question, of course. There is the side of the Nationalist Chinese government's attitude toward her relationships to the United States. We certainly have to see that. Dr. Chen, do you want to comment to this from your point of view, from your side of the Pacific?

DR. CHEN: Following the thought of Mr. Feis, it is well-known that during the century and a half of intercourse between the American and the Chinese peoples, we have had nothing but the most cordial and friendly relations over that period until the Communists came to domination on the mainland of China in 1949, by which time, as is well-known, the Communists adopted a violently anti-American attitude. Now the United States has recently concluded a treaty with the Republic of China and I noted that the text of it is included in your selected reading so it is not necessary to go into the provisions of the treaty, but there is a larger aspect of it. Of course, the United States, I assume, did not enter into a treaty like that entirely out of considerations of sentiment. It is of some vital interest to the United States also. That is what is known as world order -- orderly conduct of world affairs -- and this can be accomplished only when the cause of freedom is being defended against the encroachment of the Communist world.

MR. WITMAN: There is one thing that hasn't been said so far and that is we have talked entirely here in terms of America's commitment to what seems to be the preservation of a status quo in Formosa and Nationalist China. Now what are the objectives of the Nationalist Chinese government to which we may have committed ourselves? Does the Nationalist Chinese government seek to change the status quo? Does it seek to restore its position on the mainland of China? Is the United States involved in this objective of the Nationalist government?

DR. CHEN: There is no doubt, and it is well-known, that the free Chinese are devoting themselves to freeing the Chinese people on the mainland from Communist domination. However, it is our belief that the deliverance of the Chinese people from Communism can only be accomplished by the Chinese themselves and not with any outside force which may be employed to help the Chinese people to free themselves from Communism. However, negatively there is a great deal that the free world can do to help the Chinese people in this very big task and perhaps in the short time at my disposal I can best define it by saying that the free world might consider refraining from undertaking any measure which might give aid and comfort to the Communists.

MR. WITMAN: Dr. Chen has answered our question. How about this, Dr. Linebarger? Do you want to talk to it?

DR. LINEBARGER: I must point out that in the last presidential election the Republicans made a very definite point of supporting liberation -- a point which they attributed to themselves and not to the Democrats. Since the Republicans have come to power, the actual dynamic or aggressive American operation of liberation -- for example, a successful American invasion of Poland or China to liberate people from Communism -- has been pretty thoroughly forgotten and we have in actual policy today -- which strikes me as being both humane and practical, although it may not be as glorious as some others, the actual policy is to support liberation when and as it shows up of its own in China, Poland, Czechoslovakia or anywhere, to sustain the moral and psychological pressure against the USSR, by bringing up the question of the satellites and unfree peoples and, at the same time, by refraining from the use of military force which would have the effect, not of liberating the oppressed people, but of destroying them and perhaps a lot of us in the bargain.

DR. FEIS: I think that covers it except in its most difficult and, in a way, its most pertinent segment -- which is that if we contemplate reaching a settlement with Communist China, a negotiated settlement of any kind, which ends what is usually called the present tension -- or diminishes it, it cannot be ended -- it can be foreseen that almost certainly one of the obligations we would have to accept in some form or other is that we should no longer give encouragement to attempts to upset that regime in mainland Asia and mainland China. I don't find that problem faced in the statements of the situation which have been made.

MR. WITMAN: Now you are bringing us into face to face relationships with the problem of the regime in the mainland of China and this is becoming a very immediate, current and practical problem because beginning tomorrow the government of the United States and the government of the Communist regime in China are going to meet to exchange views on certain limited matters. Does this mean, in fact, that we are moving toward changing our relationship with the Communist regime in China? Does it mean, to put it quite bluntly, that we are moving toward recognition?

DR. LINEBARGER: I believe the present meeting is the third in a series of relations between ourselves and the so-called Peoples Government of China. We negotiated with them at great length at Panmunjon, we had one of their generals come to New York and insult us, insult our government, call us criminals, germ warriors, murderers and swine, at U.S. hospitality -- and then go back and renegotiate quite extensively at Panmunjon. I do not believe that negotiation with a de-facto government which has been shooting at us amounts to any more recognition that we've given in the past and my own view is that the Chinese Communists on their side have sent a very low-ranking man, actually though a pleasant person whom I have known for years, Mr. Wang Ping-nan, down from Warsaw. We are sending a brilliant but relatively junior man to meet him and I don't think that the negotiations in Geneva are one bit closer to recognition than before.

MR. WITMAN: I'm inclined to want to raise the question of how far should we go in furthering our connection with the Communist Chinese but yet short of recognition? So far we have had an expression of opinion around the panel here that recognition at this point is not a step to be taken and that the meeting in Geneva does not constitute even a step in that direction. Well, if it is not a step to take, suppose we talk a little bit about why you think it is not. Let's talk to that point. How do you feel about this matter of recognition? Apparently you, Mr. Feis, feel that it should not be undertaken at this point. Why not?

DR. FEIS: I say no -- it should not be. I don't see any distinct advantages to be gained from it and I do see that following upon recognition the question of admission to the United Nations and the question of Formosa become more difficult to manage, so I should think, subject to changing my mind, that before facing the question of recognition we would want to make up our minds to the regime of Formosa, the relationship of the Nationalist government of China to the problem and the question of admission to the U.N. and that the question of recognition would be decided or might be decided after we had reached some sort of satisfactory agreement, if ever we should, on these other questions. Let me make one additional comment about the Geneva meeting, as to whether it is a step towards recognition. It could be, or it could be quite the contrary. It could end in a fresh and more harsh quarrel than we've ever had with the Chinese. At this moment I don't feel I can fore-tell in the least.

MR. WITMAN: Then there is some potential of explosive possibility in this coming week. Are there any other reasons why you feel as you do, whichever way you feel, Dr. Linebarger?

DR. LINEBARGER: I believe that it is both immoral and highly inexpedient for us to attempt to befriend the one organized government of the world which has waged open war against the United Nations and which has left that war without a peace settlement, with nothing more than an armistice. I believe that it is up to Red China to make its peace, not with us but with the U.N., whom the U.N. recognizes as having been attacked by. When the Communist Chinese have met and fulfilled the terms of the Korean Armistice, when they have ceased their aggression against the other nations of the world, then there might be time to examine these questions further but I think it would be very unwise for us to rush in and try to make friends with them on the side when their condition of open war with the U.N. is unsettled.

MR. WITMAN: This is, of course, essentially an American problem. I'm quite aware of that fact. But I do think we should ask our guest whether he has any marked difference with this point of view which you have heard expressed -- our official from the Nationalist government of China, Dr. Chen.

DR. CHEN: I don't have any marked difference of view on that, except I would like to add perhaps a couple of points to it. As I understand it, the United States has from time to time announced its policy. As far back as during the time when the Japanese first attacked China and long before the second World War, that the United States holds it as its policy not to recognize the fruits of aggression and in our view, the Communist regime in China today is a fruit of Soviet aggression against China -- a fact which has also been found to be so by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Another thing is that in this contest between the free world and the Communist world, it has also been announced from time to time that we would not yield any further free territories and populations to the Communist nation. As far as the negotiations that will start tomorrow in Geneva are concerned, we have been assured that they will be limited to matters concerning the imprisoned Americans and I might add that these Americans were imprisoned by the Chinese Communists for no reason at all and that last year during the General Assembly of the United Nations the matter was brought up and my government was among the first to support the position of the United States in trying to free these imprisoned Americans. What I have been saying is to add perhaps two footnotes to what has been said before and we sincerely hope that the negotiations to open tomorrow will not lead to any thought of recognizing Red China because in our view such a step as recognition necessarily would add greatly to the prestige and control of the Communist regime on the subject Chinese people.

MR. WITMAN: The point in which we find ourselves right now is, I think, a very interesting one. We have carried our discussion this way. We have established the fact that there are certain problems in American relationship to the Far East and these problems are vital to the national interest of the United States and that it is, therefore, important and significant that the United States examine these questions thoroughly and fully. Then we went on to say in order to understand the significance of this, to see the outlook for American policy in the Far East, we have to see certain facts and among those facts is the basic consideration of America's commitments to Nationalist China and Nationalist China's relationship to the United States and we examined those -- we quickly looked at them -- we said there are legal, we said that there are strategic, we said that there are historical deeply imbedded considerations from the past which bind us to the Nationalist Chinese government. We also have indicated that the Nationalist Chinese government has certain aspirations and Dr. Chen talked some about those, but they are aspirations, he says, which do not involve us in a liberation movement. Now we went on from there to a discussion of the question of recognition and we asked whether the meeting which is coming up next week might be a step in that direction. We thought probably it would not. We also considered the disadvantages of recognition. We said there are a good many reasons why it should not be. We'll probably face another aspect of that question very shortly.

This week's winner of the American Peoples Encyclopedia is J. L. Morrison of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, who submitted this question: "What are the current advantages and disadvantages to the United States of encouraging Japan to resume some of her habitual commerce with China?" Now this takes us into an area of an economic consideration of this general topic and this is an appropriate place for us to begin the discussion of it.

DR. LINEBARGER: I would like to make a comment for the purpose of having Dr. Feis modify my comment. I believe that the illusion of trade with Communist China is an illusion. I don't believe that under the Communist system of economic controls, that anyone -- Japanese, British, Americans or others -- is going to accomplish the volume of trade which was characteristic of prewar China. The Chinese consumers' market has been suppressed by law. The Chinese Peoples Government, so-called, buys what

it wants, not what the Chinese consumers want. Therefore, I for one see no particular harm in letting the Japanese and the British and anyone else who wants to, trade with Communist China all they want to in non-strategic materials so as to let them get over that illusion in their own way, instead of having us Americans preach at them. I'd be very happy to hear Dr. Feis's comment on that general point of view.

DR. FEIS: I regret that I find so very little to modify, perhaps just to add this: that the problem would lie in drawing the line or limit in this field of strategic materials and what materials, what weapons would be of true value today is very difficult to determine. Otherwise, my line of thought runs completely in accordance with Dr. Linebarger's.

MR. WITMAN: All right. We have two points of view here which are completely the same point of view. Now the question is answered and let us move into the audience. I think we've had considerable discussion up here at the panel and I see many, many anxious people sitting on the edges of their seats wanting to participate, so let's begin our audience questions.

QUESTIONER: My name is Howard LaFay of Washington, D.C. Gentlemen, we all agree that the Chinese Peoples Government is a tyranny, but what is the Nationalist? K. C. Wu, Formosa's distinguished ex-Nationalist Governor, states categorically that freedom does not exist on Formosa and that the ultimate power is wielded by a ruthless secret police organization. Would anyone care to comment?

DR. LINEBARGER: Howard Fast, one of the most distinguished American novelists and a winner, I believe, of the Stalin prize, states that the citizens of New York are being herded off to murder camps at this time. I believe that any tendentious politician can slander government as a whole and poor K. C. Wu, whom I have known for twenty years, is simply talking very exaggerated and very foolish talk. I have visited Formosa myself, recently several times, and I believe it to be the best governed area.

DR. FEIS: To the extent it may be so, I shouldn't think it should be determining and besides, I can see distinctions -- important distinctions -- between the two types of dictatorship -- one a friendly one and the other an unfriendly one -- one such an efficient compulsive dictatorship, the other not -- one seeking improvement, looking towards freedom, the other dismissing it. Those seem to me differences in quality apart from bearing on American policy.

DR. CHEN: I am in substantial agreement with both Dr. Linebarger and Dr. Feis. I do want to add one point here and that is that there is no doubt in the record of the Administration in Formosa since 1949 that the Chinese government is trying to do its very best in the direction of freedom and democratic government. I can cite many instances to show that, but time does not permit me to do so. However, there might be some instances where a visiting American might find it rather difficult to understand but that, we must bear in mind, Formosa is, at the present time, at the very forefront of the struggle against militant Communism and that certain military measures which had to be taken as any other government would have taken the same measures to protect its security. That area of military security is being refused to the militant and that any impartial visitor in Formosa today will find -- and I'm very glad that Dr. Linebarger found it so, that Formosa is probably one of the most well governed areas in the Far East.

QUESTIONER: I'm Geraldine Fitch from Formosa, and since I got a question in as the last one recently on one of these Town Hall programs, I thought maybe I'd try to get it in early this time. I'd like to just add to the question that has just been raised that I, too, have known former Governor Wu as long as Dr. Linebarger, possibly longer, and he is on record during the times that I have been on Formosa in these last five years -- he is on record many times as speaking of the development of democracy there in Formosa. He would say we are here establishing a pattern that we will carry over to the mainland when we return. It is only since his own administration has been under attack and he has come to this country that he has turned against his own written statements which are on the record. I also left Formosa in May with the Mayor of Taipei. He was on the same plane. He's a Formosan. He won his election against candidates of the Nationalists.

government or of Kuomintang, which also shows that there is a great degree of freedom if a candidate that you would call a Formosan could win against this Kuomintang candidate in the election. My question is about this general one that was just turned in. I have noted this trend towards more trade with Red China, including a relaxation of certain items on the strategic embargo list and I am wondering if people in this country, that is, Americans, realize that this would break the most effective resistance to the Chinese Communist regime in China. The resistance of the peasant with the only weapon at his command, refusal to produce food. China, as you know, is 80% agricultural. If the farmers are willing to make the sacrifices and take the risks of this resistance which is already having a decided effect on the regime, should the free world, especially Americans with their surplus food, bale out the Peiping or the Communist regime.

MR. WITMAN: That is a statement in reply to some of the questions that have already come up and we appreciate that observation. Let's go to the next question now.

QUESTIONER: I'm R. Walston Chubb of the St. Louis Council on World Affairs. I would like to ask a question of fact, and I don't mind revealing my ignorance about this. It has seemed to me that at the threshold of all this problem of recognition is the humiliating matter of the release of these flyers and of American persons. That has been a condition precedent to any kind of talk of recognition in the minds of Americans and I am sure I subscribe to that. May I ask how it happens that this matter has become a subject of unilateral negotiations and discussions between the United States and the Communist regime. Was not that a matter for the United Nations, and wouldn't we be better off, as an involved party in this matter, to let the United Nations handle it and plead our case and sit tight on that question without concessions of any kind?

DR. LINEBARGER: My impression is that Mr. Dulles has been very successful in reconciling extremely contradictory positions, any one of which might get us in deeper trouble -- that our present contact with the Chinese Communists comes at the recommendation of outside governments, according to the press, the British and the Indian governments. I, for one, am willing to sacrifice a little American pride and even a little American dignity if we can get those people out of there. I'd like to say, however, to you, Mr. Chubb and our listeners on the air, that I am very proud of three criminals -- the three rascals who have been arrested by the military police in San Francisco have turned out to be something new in the history of Communism. They are American traitors who supported Communism but they were so inadjustable because they were delinquent, they got drunk, they pinched girls, they broke up peace rallies, that the Communists themselves didn't know what to do with thoroughly delinquent young Americans and that strikes me as being a pretty interesting development on the world scene. Those three fellows got themselves loose.

MR. CHUBB: There is a little more to my question than the specific issue which I don't think has been answered about this matter. It seems to me that freedom is not necessarily a positive thing. It is an opportunity. It seems to me that that is the weakness of our position against harebrained propaganda such as seems to have taken possession of the minds of these Chinese politicians and, therefore, my question was directed more or less to the general policy of playing a waiting game with patience here, rather than adopting an aggressive policy at all, and the United Nations seems to me as the arbiter and the only judicial and the only world government we have as a recourse for handling these matters, and that that method should be handled with respect to the prisoners and other issues. I don't think you quite answered my question.

DR. LINEBARGER: As a matter of practical politics, it is my impression that the United States could not have got more aggressive action out of the United Nations against the Chinese Communists at this time and that given the present circumstances, Mr. Dulles felt it was much more important to get our people loose than it was to wait for our allies to make up their minds. I refer again to the tremendous consequences of the Summit meeting which are just now beginning to unfold. If they do unfold at all, it may very well be that the China situation will be relaxed as a byproduct, which it is, of the Moscow-Washington relationship.

QUESTIONER: I'm Mrs. Lush of Ames, Iowa. Within the range of government expediency, is there any specific means that the experts provide us to help the Chinese on the mainland to express themselves in this period of waiting?

DR. LINEBARGER: In my opinion, the only way they can express themselves is by getting out. I did have the privilege of serving twice as an American civilian with our armed forces in Korea in the Korean War. As an American brought up in China, I confess myself shocked at the tremendous proportion of men who, once they came to the United Nations side of the lines in Korea, turned completely against Chinese Communism. That included Communists -- former Communists and former non-Communists. I believe the Chinese will speak up against Communism but they've got to get to a position where they will not be killed in a few minutes or hours or days, for doing so.

DR. FEIS: Only in direct measures it may be that if we are convincing enough in words and actions to other people, such as the Indians, Pakistanis, Burmese, the Japanese, that they will find less blocked channels of communication with the Chinese than ours are at the present time but, beyond that, how to effect the complete administered stereotypes with which your Chinese Communist officials fill the vision of the Chinese people, I do not know.

DR. CHEN: May I refer to the question before this about these American prisoners in Communist China. I mentioned a moment ago that the United States did try to use the United Nations to seek the freedom of these imprisoned Americans. The United States was compelled to appeal to the General Assembly rather than the Security Council of the United Nations for the simple reason that any motion in the Security Council would be vetoed by the Soviet Union, that is, is expected to be vetoed by the Soviet Union. Now the General Assembly of the United Nations in the words of, I believe, the late Senator Vandenberg, is a Town Meeting of the World and a very overwhelming majority of the General Assembly expressed their concern over these imprisoned Americans and instructed the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, to seek their release. Mr. Hammarskjold went to Peiping and there was no result which all goes to show, it seems to me, that whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations is supposed to reflect the opinion of the world, the Chinese Communists just don't care.

MR. CHUBB: I thank you very much. I was aware of those developments and I was wondering if it wouldn't be better policy for us, inasmuch as we are before this Town Meeting of the World and the conscience of the world to rest our case there, rather than humiliate ourselves by unilateral negotiation which comes back to the original question. I take it that there is not quite agreement among the panel on my question.

QUESTIONER: I'm Robert Abbey from Washington, D.C. I'd like to direct this question to Mr. Feis. Wouldn't you agree that a realistic U.S. Policy towards Communist China must take into account the relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union. To what extent, if any, is the Communist Party of Communist China subservient to the Communist Party of Soviet Russia.

DR. FEIS: I don't know and there isn't even time enough to explain what I don't know. But I have this single thought on the subject -- a thought that I think somewhat neglected -- that in discussions of the mutual relationship and influence between Soviet Russia and Communist China, it usually runs in terms that aren't quite appropriate. Can you separate them? Will they work together, etc. That type of question. I think rather the usual question is: how much strain and what kinds of strain will they stand -- is there a breaking point -- where would that breaking point be? But the question is rather in that form. I've got a sense -- a pure ignorant hunch -- that for the first time some question of not separation, some issue, presented itself that was beyond the bounds in regard to immediate possible attack on Formosa, with Moscow saying this goes beyond what we want now.

QUESTIONER: I'm Charles Nelson of Chicago. May I suggest that the panel has not yet faced the problem of recognition. We all understand that the Communist Chinese government is not going to be recognized next week in Geneva. The question is what kind of diplomatic and political relations must we develop with this regime over the next say, two to five years?

DR. LINEBARGER: I'm going to stick my neck out and make a categorical recommendation. I recommend that our relationship to Communist China should be the same as our relationship in 1931 and 1945 to the empire of Manchouko. We never denied that Manchouko, the Japanese puppet state was there. We did not attack Manchouko, but we did not feel that because it was there on Japanese maps, we had to open a legation to deal with them.

QUESTIONER: Most of us never heard of Manchouko, but China is a pretty big power, isn't it?

DR. LINEBARGER: China is a big power and China has two governments today. We recognize the government which a very large proportion of the Chinese people regard as legitimate. The other government is there only for a few years, even by Chinese standards it is very short-lived. I categorically recommend non-recognition for at least ten or twenty years.

QUESTIONER: I'd like to know what Dr. Feis thinks about this.

DR. FEIS: I wouldn't know again whether we might recognize, should recognize, or under what conditions. I, of course, do know that what Mr. Linebarger suggests is floating in the air, for the reason you give that the existing political social fact is the large mainland China under Communist rule creating situations such as the one in regard to Formosa, Korea, Indochina, of which we feel compelled to take heed. That fact compels us to take heed of the Chinese government situated on the mainland will constantly present you with the question, if not of formal recognition, of what your relationship is to be and the idea of treating it the way you treat Manchouko verges on the dreamlike.

DR. CHEN: May I ask Mr. Feis whether, by the act of American recognition of the Communist regime in China, that that regime would change its spots?

DR. FEIS: I wouldn't know again. It might -- and it might for the worse as well as for the better. In political affairs frequently for a greater cause, you have to deal with or you find it best to deal with a regime that is quite obnoxious to you. Now, I wouldn't want that to be construed as a plea of advocacy of immediate recognition, but merely to be construed as the fact that I think the possibility of recognition at some time under circumstances to be worked up, should certainly not be debarred from our minds and from the possibilities open to the people of our government.

QUESTIONER: I'm Albert Gendebien, Lafayette College. What are the criteria for establishing our recognition policy as acceptance on the part of the people of the government in power? I'd like to know what the people in mainland China would think about the Kuomintang government if they could get rid of the Red Chinese government? Would they accept it back after their experiences of the '20's and '30's?

DR. LINEBARGER: We have the categorical answer of that written in blood. The actual experience of the men in Korea. Those men came right out of the Communist army and what they asked for -- was Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan. I confess myself startled that they did, but they asked for it by overwhelming numbers.

QUESTIONER: I'm Robert W. Smith of Minneapolis and St. Paul. I'd like to return to this business of trade for a moment. It seems to me that Mrs. Fitch in, I think, trying to support the panel sort of showed the basic difficulties and perhaps impossibilities of their recommendations. They talked about not trading in strategic materials and she pointed out the very strategic necessity of food in China. I don't see how you can definite strategic materials not to include every bit of trade.

DR. LINEBARGER: There is always a balance between that is economically desirable for a position of power on our side and what is practically necessary. I can see that food is strategic but I believe that if we maintain pressure on those items which are particularly short -- machine tools, high octane gasoline for aircraft and things of

that kind -- that we would have to make a relatively minor sacrifice by allowing these other things, primarily for consumer use to go through. We'd pay a price for it, but that's the price we have to pay to get along with our allies.

QUESTIONER: I'm Chester Graham from Jamestown, North Dakota. In view of the success we seemingly have had in exchange of people between Russia and the United States, should we try to get a similar exchange of people from Communist China?

DR. FEIS: I have never understood why we fought with so much desire and enthusiasm for the exchange of people with the Soviet Union, so I certainly do not understand why I should lust with enthusiasm to exchange people with Communist China, so I'm a poor one to answer your question. May I revert to the previous question, I think it's useful. The question about trade was not whether we should trade with China, but as to whether we should restrain Japan from trading with China and at least I would want my answer to stand in reference to that question, not to the question of American trade with China.

QUESTIONER: I'm Harry Boardman of New York City. Dr. Feis at the beginning spoke of one of the problems of our current discussion as one of staying away from the fringe of war. It seems to me that much that has been said today has driven us much more closely to the heart of it.

MR. WITMAN: That's a very challenging point on which we have to end. I'm sure that we could do another hour of this program, but we simply have to stop.

I want to take our speakers -- our panel members and all of the people who are participating in this seminar and the latter half who have made such a vital and moving thing and put our panel speakers on such a spot.

Our thanks also to Dr. Ralph C. Hutchison, President of Lafayette College and to his staff, and also to Station WEEU of Reading.

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